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Abstract In this paper, we argue that lower prices for pharmaceuticals can be achieved
by fostering a new type of competition in the pharmaceutical industry. Lower drug
development costs, and hence prices, can be brought about by abolishing national drug
administrations and replacing them with private certification boards that compete on the
basis of safety, efficiency and cost of their drug approval process. A major benefit of this
type of privatization is that it would not necessitate limits on data exclusivity in order to
achieve lower prices. Drug approval privatization could achieve the same positive results
as generic competition, in terms of lower costs and prices, without the negative effects of
intellectual property rights violation and the consequent discouragement of innovative
activities.
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‘‘The FDA has done enormous harm to the health of the American public by greatly
increasing the costs of pharmaceutical research, thereby reducing the supply of new
and effective drugs, and by delaying the approval of such drugs as survive the
tortuous FDA process.’’—Milton Friedman.
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1 Introduction
The price of pharmaceuticals is an issue of great concern for governments around the world.
Soaring national health budgets and the fear that underprivileged populations have only limited
access to life-saving medicines, has motivated policymakers to seek ways in which they can
intervene in the market for pharmaceuticals. The most widespread solution that governments
have adopted for affecting the price of pharmaceuticals is to foster generic competition.
National regulatory authorities currently allow potential entrants (generic firms) to use test
data, generated and paid for by already existing innovator firms, in order to gain marketing
authorization for their competing products. Generic firms need only show bio-equivalence.
They do not need to incur the same level of costs as the innovator in performing clinical trials.
The ability of generic firms to ‘‘free-ride’’ on the investment of innovators enables them to
charge lower prices upon expiration of the innovator’s period of data exclusivity.
Generic competition has so far been quite successful in achieving the intended goal of
lower drug prices. However, government-sanctioned ‘‘free-riding’’ also has its drawbacks.
Although prices in the market for pharmaceuticals have come down, the development costs
that research-based pharmaceutical companies incur have not. This harms the incentives
for innovators to continue innovating. Policymakers are essentially gambling that the very
visible benefit of lower current prices for existing pharmaceuticals will outweigh the much
less-visible social cost of future life-saving drugs never being introduced to the market.
This paper argues that lower prices for pharmaceuticals can be achieved by fostering a
different type of competition in the pharmaceutical industry. Generic competition should
not be thought of as the only way to foster competition and reduce prices. Lower drug
development costs, and hence prices, can also be brought about through a privatization of
the drug approval process. National drug administrations could be abolished and replaced
with private certification boards that compete on the basis of safety, efficiency and cost of
their drug approval process. A major advantage of this type of privatization is that it would
not necessitate limits on data exclusivity in order to achieve lower prices. That is, drug
approval privatization could achieve the same positive results as generic competition, in
terms of lower costs and prices, without the negative effects of intellectual property rights
confiscation and the consequent discouragement of innovative activities.
The rest of this paper unfolds as follows. The next section reviews the empirical
evidence that suggests that intellectual property protection (such as data exclusivity) is
important for continued innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. Section 3 describes the
different systems of intellectual property protection currently in place in the US and
Europe, and the origin of generic drug competition. Section 4 focuses on the accelerating
costs of the current monopolistic regulatory drug approval process. Section 5 expands upon
the main idea of the paper, the feasibility and desirability of an alternative competitive
market in drug certification. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 Intellectual property, profits and innovation
New drugs are the fruit of long and costly research and development (R&D) by phar-
maceutical companies.1 R&D investment by pharmaceutical companies amounted to more
than $60 billion in 2003 in the U.S and in Europe. One of the most important factors that
1 The Association of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) reported an
estimated $33.2 billion on R&D expenditures in 2003. The European Federation of Pharmaceutical
Industries and Associations (EFPIA) reported R&D investment of 21.1 billion euros for the same year.
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supports continued investment in R&D is intellectual property protection. A well-known
study by Mansfield (1994) arrived at this conclusion by surveying the R&D directors of
100 U.S. firms between the years 1981 and 1983. Respondents were asked to estimate the
fraction of their inventions that would not have been developed without patent protection.
The average fraction across all industries was 14%, while in the pharmaceutical industry it
was 60% (see also Levin et al. 1987; Cohen et al. 1997). Taylor and Silberston (1973)
found similar results in a survey of U.K. R&D-doing firms. The data indicated that in the
absence of patent protection, R&D investment would have been 64% lower.
These pioneering studies of the role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in R&D
activities, have raised the question, why are IPRs so much more important in the phar-
maceutical industry than elsewhere? Grabowski (2002) provides a compelling answer. He
argues that IPRs are crucial in pharmaceutical innovation because of the high cost of
innovation relative to the cost of imitation. Patent protection and data protection provide
innovators with a period of market exclusivity that allows them to recoup their large initial
investments and earn a profit. Without such protection, innovative products would be
quickly imitated at a very low cost, rendering the original R&D effort almost worthless.2
On a related point, Grabowski and Vernon (2000) find that among the 118 new chemical
entities (NCEs) introduced to the market between 1990 and 1994, only 30% of them had a
present value of net revenue that exceeded their R&D costs. For the median drug, the cost of
R&D was not recovered. It was only among the few high selling drugs, known as block-
busters, that the return to R&D was substantial (five times greater than the return to all other
drugs). This wide range of returns in new drug investment led the authors to conclude that
R&D effort in the pharmaceutical industry is mainly driven by the search for a blockbuster.
In fact, research-based pharmaceutical companies need to have some top selling drugs
in order to cross-subsidize other less-profitable R&D investments. Legislative enactments
that weaken IPRs and lower the price of blockbusters, without lowering costs of devel-
opment, could therefore cause a cascading reduction in pharmaceutical innovation. Gi-
accotto et al. (2003) provide empirical evidence for this latter contention, in the context of
price controls. They find that pharmaceutical R&D would be 30% lower were the U.S
government to introduce price limits on drugs. Lowering R&D by 30% would result in 330
to 365 fewer new drugs within a 20-year period.
On the issue of pharmaceutical price controls, Brouwers et al. (2004) similarly find that
if countries imposing price controls were to remove them, R&D expenditures would in-
crease by $17 to 22 billion, and between 10 and 13 new compounds a year would be
introduced to the market. In a recent paper by Acemoglu and Linn (2004), it is found that a
1% increase in market size for a drug category would lead to a 4–6% percent increase in
the in the number of new drugs brought to the market.
The accumulated body of empirical evidence thus makes it quite clear that price con-
trols and weak IPRs discourage R&D expenditures and innovation.3 Nonetheless, it is still
legitimate to ask just how costly less innovation is to current and future generations. That
2 In general, firms that produce easily copyable goods, like pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and software are
more concerned with IPRs than firms investing in products that are costly or difficult to imitate, like
computer hardware or electronic assembly equipment (see Levin et al. 1987).
3 The link between IPRs, innovation and economic growth is exhaustively examined in Lerner (2002),
where it is found that relatively wealthier countries are more likely to have patent systems, to grant longer
patents, and to respect other countries’ patent rules. See Hassett and Hubbard (2002) for a review of the
literature that links profit variables with the level of business fixed investment (such as R&D). See also
Griliches (1992) for the importance of R&D investments in explaining economic growth throughout the 20th
century.
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is, lower prices for already existing drugs that follows from generic entry, and which are
brought about by the violation of IPRs in the form of weak data protection, could
potentially outweigh the social costs of less pharmaceutical innovation in the future.
On the benefit side of the equation, The U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
(1998) found that consumers save a substantial amount of money. Consumers of phar-
maceuticals saved between 8 and 10 billion dollars from 1990 to 1995 due to price
competition from the generic industry. At introduction, generics sell, on average, at 61% of
the brand name. After 2 years, as more generics enter the market, generics sell, on average,
at 37% of the original brand name (see Grabowski and Vernon 2000).
On the cost side, the CBO study also found that the U.S. Hatch-Waxman Act, which
further eased the entry of generics into the drug market, had a significant negative impact
on R&D by research-based pharmaceutical companies. A study by Lichtenberg (2002)
provides more direct evidence on the social value of innovation in the pharmaceutical
industry and the potential loss to society of less R&D activities. He finds that pharma-
ceutical R&D and the introduction of new drugs significantly impact the economy through
increased longevity, productivity and savings in other types of medical expenses. New drug
approval in a given year increases the lifetime expectancy of people born that year by
.016 years. Aggregating this number over all births in that year, as well as future births,
yields a total increase of 1.2 million life-years for each yearly drug approval. Lichtenberg
estimates that for each extra dollar spent on prescription drugs, $4.5 is gained through
productivity enhancement, while each extra dollar spent on drugs reduces other health
related expenses by almost $4.
It is also important to note that there is a substantial rate of depreciation in the value of
old drugs, implying that future innovation is essential for the gains in health and wealth to
be sustainable. Consistent with the findings of Lichtenberg, Murphy and Topel (2003) cite
estimates that impute $5.1 trillion in economic value to new discoveries yielding a 10%
reduction in the death rate for heart disease, and $4.4 trillion economic value to new
discoveries yielding a 10% reduction in the death rate for cancer.
3 Weak IPRs and the origin of generic competition
3.1 Patents and data exclusivity
IPRs in the pharmaceutical industry mainly rest on two instruments, patents and data
exclusivity. Patents are usually given for 20 years from the day the patent is accepted by
the national patent office. For most innovations, holding a patent is equivalent to having
marketing authorization and market exclusivity for a certain period of time. For NCEs,
however, holding a patent can be quite disconnected from having marketing authorization.
In fact, it can take 10 years, on average, before a newly patented medicine reaches the
patient’s bedside. After receiving a patent, the innovator must prove the safety and effi-
ciency of the new drug to the regulatory authority.
In order to prove safety and efficiency of a new drug, pre-clinical and clinical tests must
be performed. The results of these tests, conducted on animals and humans, are reported in
the registration dossier prepared for the regulatory authority. Because of the large
investment in time and money needed to successfully gain marketing approval through
clinical trials, the data generated during these testing phases is kept confidential and cannot
be exploited by potential competitors for a certain number of years. This protection is
referred to either as data exclusivity or data protection.
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Data protection is an IPR that is distinct from a patent right. New drugs that are not
patented or have an expired patent can be protected by data exclusivity. When data pro-
tection expires, a competitor can rely on the safety and efficiency tests performed by the
innovator, and in the possession of the regulatory authority. If the competitor can show bio-
equivalence to the pioneer drug, no further tests are required. The competitor, most often
generic firms, can then enter the market, saving millions of dollars in pre-clinical and
clinical trials. The significantly lower level of investment needed for a generic to gain
marketing approval directly translates into a lower price in that class of medicine.
Because of the high costs in time and money of gaining marketing approval from the
regulatory authority, and the contentious legal environment surrounding patents, data
exclusivity is fast becoming the dominant IP tool in the pharmaceutical industry.
Increasingly stringent requirements for clinical trials have reduced the patent life of
innovative drugs. The average patent life remaining after marketing approval in 2001 was
7.8 years, instead of the original 20 years of patent protection (FDA 2002). In comparison,
other industrial sectors enjoy an average patent life of more than 18.5 years.
The last 10 years have also witnessed an increase in legal patent disputes between
generic and research-based pharmaceutical companies. Generics have been quite suc-
cessful in challenging patents in the U.S. and in Europe and have a strong incentive to do
so. In the U.S., the first generic to challenge a patent is given 180 days of market exclu-
sivity. According to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), generics have a 75%
success rate in challenging patents.
For most drugs, patent protection goes beyond data protection. However, if the testing
period has been extremely long, or if the drug does not have full patent protection, data
exclusivity can be the only form of IP. For example, Eprex from Jancen Cilag and Arava
manufactured by Aventis had data protection beyond patent life by 1 and 2 years,
respectively. Taxol manufactured by Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) is protected only by
data exclusivity. BMS does not hold a patent since Taxol was licensed to BMS from the
U.S. National Cancer Institute.
3.2 IPRs in the US
Perhaps the most important relatively recent U.S. legislation that altered the role of patent
protection and data exclusivity in the pharmaceutical industry is the Hatch-Waxman Act.
The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 granted generic companies easier access to the drug
market. The ‘‘Bolar’’ clause derived from the Hatch-Waxman Act gave generics the right
to start testing bio-equivalency even before patent expiration, so that generics can enter the
market almost immediately upon patent expiration.
The Hatch-Waxman Act did, however, also recognize the need to further protect market
exclusivity for research-based pharmaceutical companies. The law restores part of the
patent life lost by innovators in the process of obtaining marketing approval. The maxi-
mum patent life allowed under the law is 14 years regardless of the time spent on testing. A
maximum of 5 years of patent life can be restored. Grabowski and Vernon (1996) find that
the average patent extension is 2.33 years for NCEs introduced in the first half of the
1990’s.
A FTC study on the impact of the Hatch-Waxman Act on competition between generics
and innovators found that since passage of the Act, generic market share has grown from
19% in 1984 to 55% in 2004. It took an average of 19 months for generics to gain
marketing approval between 1984 and 1994, and the probability of success in getting
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approval was very high. For brand names whose patents expired between 1994 and 1997,
generics captured 64% of the market share within a year, and 73% after 2 years. Prozac
became a typical example of fierce generic competition. One month after generic intro-
duction, the brand name lost 80% of its market share.
Note that another significant advantage that generics have in the drug market, beyond
the ability to ‘‘free-ride’’ on test data generated by innovators, is that they observe the
profitability of innovative pharmaceuticals and imitate only the successful ones. This fact
can be especially troublesome for the profitability of R&D. As mentioned earlier, the
profits generated by blockbusters cross-subsidize many other R&D investments.
3.3 IPRs in Europe
It is interesting, but perhaps not surprising, that the relationship between IPRs, the
incentive to innovate, and competition in the pharmaceutical industry is more complex in
Europe than it is in the U.S. Most European countries have a national public health care
system, and price controls and parallel importing are routinely used as public policy tools,
especially when it comes to blockbuster drugs. Consequently, European pharmaceutical
companies have substantially decreased their R&D expenditures over the past decade and
have turned to the American market for the introduction of new drugs (see Kingham and
Castle 2000).
In Europe, an innovator can gain marketing approval either at the European level,
through the so-called Centralized Procedure, or through national regulatory agencies via
the Decentralized Procedure. Approvals at the European level allow the innovator to
market the product in all member states. This centralized procedure is mandatory for all
biotech products and optional for other innovative products. At the European level,
10 years of data exclusivity is granted. This is double the number of years of data pro-
tection offered in the U.S.
In the Decentralized Procedure, products can also gain marketing approval throughout
the European Union via the Mutual Recognition Procedure (MRP). In the MRP, a mar-
keting application is filed in a particular member state, called the Reference Member State
(RMS). After gaining approval in the RMS, the innovator applies through the MRP for
marketing authorization in all other member states. The approval to market the drug in
other member states is not automatic and a Concerned Member State (CMS) can refuse
marketing approval. In 2000, 36% of the drugs applying through the MRP did not obtain
approval in at least one CMS.4
In the Decentralized Procedure, the innovator is granted data exclusivity that varies
between 6 and 10 years, depending on the policy of each member state.5 The period of data
protection is essentially measured from the first marketing authorization within the EU.
When data protection expires in the RMS, generic firms are allowed to file for marketing
approval in that state, and through the MRP, they may gain marketing approval in other
member states in which data protection has not yet expired. Further, when data protection
has expired in a particular member state, applications by generics will be accepted, even if
the patent has not expired. The patent holder is responsible for bringing an action for
4 See IMS: http://www.ims-global.com//insight/news_story/0111/news_story_011106.htm.
5 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom have a 10-year limit.
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Luxemburg have a 6-year limit. Greece, Spain and Portugal have a
6-year limit or until expiration of the patent, whichever comes first.
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infringement against the generic firm. These IPR rules in the Decentralized Procedure have
increased the incentive of pharmaceutical companies to file marketing applications in the
biggest economies first.
With the enlargement of the EU in 2003, harmonization of data protection standards
among EU member states caught the attention of policymakers. The EU Council decided
that the 10-year data exclusivity clause in the Centralized Procedure could be further
delayed by 1 year if the innovator could show that the medicine is an innovative treatment.
For drugs registered in the Decentralized Procedure, data exclusivity should be 8 years for
all member states but could be lengthened with an extra 2 years of market exclusivity. This
rule is often referred to as the 8 + 2 formula. Within the two extra years, generics would be
able to start the registration process, and launch their product as soon as the patent expires.
The 8 + 2 formula was apparently motivated by the ‘‘Bolar’’ provision of the U.S. Hatch-
Waxman Act. The European Council is hoping that these reforms will revive R&D
activities of the pharmaceutical industry in Europe.
3.4 IPRs worldwide
Data exclusivity and generic competition that derives from its violation has also become a
central issue in international forums. In April 1994, the Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement was signed by member states of the World
Trade Organization (WTO). Article 39.3 of the TRIPS agreement states that, ‘‘Members,
when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or of
agricultural chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the orig-
ination of which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair
commercial use. In addition, Members shall protect such data against disclosure, except
where necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are
protected against unfair commercial use.’’
The length of data exclusivity is not clearly established in the TRIPS agreement, and
this lack of definition has caused some signatories to almost totally ignore the data pro-
tection clause. For example, TEVA, the premier Israeli generic firm continues to have
liberal access to data produced by research-based pharmaceutical companies in Israel. This
lack of data protection has caused a substantial reduction in R&D expenditures by re-
search-based pharmaceutical companies in Israel, and has allowed TEVA to grow into one
of the largest generic multinational pharmaceutical companies in the world.
Current government and supra-government intervention in the pharmaceutical industry
that legislates rules and exceptions to IPRs, such as data exclusivity, has given rise to a
complicated competitive and legal environment that continues to harm innovation. Thus,
policymakers might want to redirect their focus onto the determinants of development
costs and its relationship with the institutional structure of drug approval. Directly pro-
moting lower development costs would appear to be a much simpler and more effective
route to achieving lower prices and continued innovation in pharmaceuticals.
4 The current drug approval process and its costs
The U.S. market for medicine functioned without any regulatory authority until 1938. The
idea of a public regulatory authority in the US arose after the appearance of a toxic drug on
the US market, elixir Sulfanilamide, which killed 107 people. A fear of unsafe drugs on the
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European market, fueled by the ‘‘thalidomide’’ affair in the 1960’s that led to fetal
deformation when used by some pregnant women, motivated the European Commission to
adopt standardized regulatory assessments to assure equivalent national regulatory pro-
cedures across member states.
The publicity surrounding the discovery of an unsafe drug in the market leads to a
public outcry that engenders high political costs. The missed gains from new medicines
that are delayed or refused are, on the other hand, more difficult for the public to discover.
Thus, government employees in national regulatory agencies have an incentive to err on
the side of caution. This asymmetry may lead regulators to allocate too many resources to
the prevention of unsafe drugs, raising approval costs beyond socially optimal levels, and
delaying or completely preventing the marketing of many safe drugs.
Regulatory authorities allow new medicines or vaccines to be sold to the public only
after extensive pre-clinical and clinical trials are performed. These trials examine the
safety, quality and efficiency of the new drug in curing diseases. The FDA (2002) estimates
that it takes, on average, 8.5 years to bring a drug to the patient’s bedside.6 Other estimates
are substantially higher. DiMasi (2001) and Adams and Brantner (2003) estimate the
duration of new drug development, from the beginning of the human testing phase to
approval, to be 10.2 and 8.05 years, respectively. Dranover and Meltzer (1994) find that it
takes 13.5 years to develop a new medicine.
In general, the current drug development process is composed of four distinct stages.
The first stage, pre-clinical tests, is usually conducted before the innovator files an
Investigatory New Drug (IND) with the regulatory authority. Pre-clinical tests include
genetic analysis and animal testing, and last 3.5 years, on average. Many drugs fail during
the first stage. According to the FDA (2002), only one out of 1,000 drugs pass the pre-
clinical stage.
For the few drugs that pass the pre-clinical testing stage, and review by the regulatory
authority, the drug enters human clinical trials, composed of three different phases (I, II,
and III). Phase I is carried out on a group of 20–80 healthy volunteers to primarily test the
safety of the product. Phase II includes several hundred patients afflicted with the disease.
Phase III is an extension of Phase II on a larger number of patients, usually between several
hundred and a thousand.
Table 1 reports the average number of months spent in each stage, and the probability of
success.
As Table 1 shows, the probability of successfully moving from one phase to the next,
conditional on reaching that phase, is not monotonic. In the later phases of development,
the probability of success decreases. The length of time spent on development and the
Table 1 Duration and success rate for new chemical drugs7
Pre-clinical Phase I Phase II Phase III & FDA Approval Total
Probability of success .1% 80.7% 57.7% 56.7% .03%
Successful duration (in months) 42 19.7 29.9 47 96.6
6 See: http://www.fda.gov/fdac/graphics/newdrugspecial/drugchart.pdf, last accessed December 2004.
7 See Abrantes-Metz et al. (2003).
516 C. Sauer, R. M. Sauer
123
probability of success is also not a function of the size of the firm. The ‘‘big-pharmas,’’ as
measured by the number of drugs that the firm has in development, do not have a clear
advantage over ‘‘non-big pharmas.’’8
After successful completion of clinical tests, the national regulatory authority must
approve the new drug. This latter process lasts, on average, one year and a half.
After gaining this last approval the new medicine can be introduced to the market,
although further post-approval tests must be conducted to detect adverse outcomes and
long-term effects. In Europe, approved new drugs are further delayed because of the
existence of government controlled health care systems. Each government has to determine
the reimbursement level for each new drug, causing additional delays of several months to
several years.
The length of time it takes for new drugs to enter the market, and the consequent cost to
society of delays, eventually became a recognized issue by national regulatory agencies.
Concern for delays led to the passage of special legislation intended to accelerate the
process. In the 1990s, the FDA adopted two new programs: ‘‘fast-track approval’’ which
expedites review of marketing approval for drugs treating serious and life-threatening
diseases, and ‘‘accelerated approval’’ for products that provide significant improvement
over existing therapies.
Europe has also implemented similar programs. The European Agency for the Evalu-
ation of Medicinal Products (EAEMP) implemented a target time of 210 days for mar-
keting approval of ‘‘orphan drugs’’ intended for the cure of rare diseases. In 2003, the goal
was reached with an average approval time of 190 days (EAEMP 2003). In addition,
‘‘orphan drugs’’ were allowed to have smaller and shorter clinical trials. In 1999, orphan
drugs were approved after testing on an average sample of 588 patients. Non-orphan drugs
are tested on over 5,000 patients.
Although the measures adopted by regulatory authorities in the US and Europe, for a
few selected products, are commendable, much further progress in shortening development
times of new medicines is possible. Note that R&D requires the payment of salaries, the
purchase of animals and expenses on equipment. The firm must invest its own capital or
borrow capital from external sources in order to finance its R&D activities. In either case,
the length of time before commercialization directly impacts the financing cost component
of R&D activities through opportunity costs or payment of interest. Shorter development
times would directly translate into lower costs and lower prices.
Estimates of the direct monetary costs of developing a new drug show that development
costs are not decreasing over time, despite the recent efforts of regulatory agencies, but are
rather dramatically increasing. An early study by Hansen (1979), using a sample of NCEs
entering human testing between the years 1963 and 1975, found that the total cost of
bringing a new drug to the market is $119 million. DiMasi et al. (1991) using a similar
sample between 1970 and 1982, found the total development cost to be $231 million,
representing a 94% increase in R&D costs between the two cohorts. The Office of
Technology Assessment (1993) confirmed the figures reached in these studies. The OTA
explains the rapid rise in R&D costs in the 1970s and 1980s by increases in labor costs, the
size of clinical trials and the costs of animals used in pre-clinical testing.
8 Because of their novelty, fewer studies on duration and probability of success have been conducted for
biological drugs. Biological drugs first appeared in the market in 1984, and by 1994, only 29 biological
entities were marketed in the U.S.
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A more recent study by DiMasi et al. (2003) uses a random sample of 68 drugs, from 10
different pharmaceutical firms, that entered clinical testing between the years 1983 and
1994. DiMasi et al. use the same methodology as earlier studies and find that the cost to the
firm of having a drug approved is $802 million dollars (in 2000 dollars). Including the post-
approval cost of testing increases the figure to $897 million.
DiMasi et al. also broke down the costs by development phase for their previous and
current studies, and estimated the allocation of R&D resources by testing phase for the
Hansen study. The results are summarized in Fig. 1.
The dramatic rise in the cost of developing a new drug is mainly explained by the
increase in size and complexity of clinical trials and higher labor costs. According to data
compiled in the US between the years 1981 and 2001, the increase in trial size was 7.47%
annually (see OTA 1993; Peck 1997; CMR 2000). As reported by DiMasi (2003), clinical
trial complexity rose by 4.8% annually from 1992 to 2000. Labor costs rose because total
R&D employment increased, as did the average salaries for scientists and researchers. The
Bureau of Labor Statistics projects this trend to continue over the next decade.9
The exceedingly high and increasing costs of drug development, combined with arti-
ficially low market prices through price controls and generic competition, places privately
initiated drug innovation at risk. It is, therefore, critical that policymakers consider alter-
native institutional arrangements for drug approval that can effectively bring down costs,
as well as prices, and that preserve the incentive to innovate.
5 Privatizing the drug approval process
5.1 Federal drug administrations and monopoly power
Drug approval in the U.S. can only be gained through the FDA, a pure public monopoly.
The European situation is quite different. The existence of the MRP allows for a measure
of competition between national regulatory authorities. A pharmaceutical company can
choose the country in which to file for drug approval. Licensing fees are paid only to the








Estimates of Capitalized Pre-Clinical, Clinical and 
Total Costs of Drug Development 
Hansen DiMasiet al.(1991) DiMasiet al. (2003)
Fig. 1 The costs of drug development
9 See BLS ‘‘Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing,’’ NAICS 3245.
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different European countries to compete. The UK, for example, streamlined its regulatory
requirements under the Thatcher government and attracted pharmaceutical companies to
seek approval there.10 This competitive environment gave rise to a convergence in ap-
proval times between countries. Approval times decreased in the UK and Germany by
almost 70% (see Thomas et al. 1998). The European experience clearly demonstrates that
competition among approval agencies can succeed in reducing approval times and overall
development costs.
However, the current European MRP faces many problems. For example, marketing
approval is rarely given in all European countries. From 1998 to 2001, the number of
Member States included in the MRP was, on average, less than half (Feick 2002). Con-
cerned States that do not receive fee payments have little incentive to accelerate approval.
It may even be in the interest of Concerned States to delay approval, in the hope of
signaling to the market that the Reference State was faster to approve, but fell short of
insuring mutual recognition. In fact, the Decentralized Procedure took 6 months longer, on
average, than the centralized procedure in 1999. The main component of delay in the MRP
is disputes between national regulatory agencies. The European CPMP that reviews dis-
putes continues to experience an increase in time to final decision.
The fact that mutual recognition has to be discussed and approved at many bureaucratic
levels slows the overall drug approval process and does not foster a truly competitive
environment. Moreover, national regulatory agencies still have an approval monopoly
within a State. This allows national agencies to strategize against each other, delay ap-
proval times, and hold the citizens of the country ‘‘hostage’’. A truly competitive market in
drug approval among monopoly national regulatory agencies may be difficult to establish.
Further devolution of drug approval to several (or many) competitive certification bodies
within each state seems necessary.
Note that the idea of competitive certification bodies is not entirely new. For example,
The Progress and Freedom Foundation (PFF) developed a proposal in 1996 in which the
idea of ‘‘Drug Certification Bodies’’ (DCBs) was advanced. DCBs were envisioned to
work independently of central regulatory agencies and a national board, similar to the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, would certify DCBs. In the
PFF plan, the responsibility of final drug approval remains with the central regulatory
agency. DCBs only compete in offering drug approval services to their clients (pharma-
ceutical companies) based on the speed of their own approvals and their quality as mea-
sured by the fraction that gain final approval from the central regulatory agency.
The PFF plan is interesting but it falls short of full competitive potential. The incentives
of the central regulatory agency would still lead to an overly cautious approach to final
drug approval. Anticipating this problem, the FPP plan proposes the establishment of an
independent commission that would oversee disputes between DCBs and the central
regulatory authority. In other words, the FPP proposes a variation on the European CPMP
for disputes within countries. This latter aspect of the FPP plan is its weakest link.
A better system, in our opinion, would be one in which DCBs are responsible not only
for assessment of safety and efficiency, but also for final drug approval. There is little need
for a central agency with final approval powers. The safety and efficiency of drugs could be
reliably determined as a result of market mechanisms and legal recourse. The importance
of reputation in maintaining clients and attracting new ones, the existence of a free press
10 As a consequence, the Medicines Control Agency (MCA) was able to raise half of its income from fees
charged to the pharmaceutical industry.
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engaging in investigative journalism, and expected penalties via the legal system for
corrupt and dangerous decisions by DCBs, should be sufficient to establish a well-func-
tioning market.
5.2 Is privatization of drug approval Kosher?
It is interesting to note that a competitive free market in product approval and certification,
analogous to the competitive market in drug certification that we propose here, has thrived
for centuries among observant Jews that adhere to the laws of Kashrut (kosher food).
According to Jewish Law, certain categories of food are forbidden for consumption, meat
and dairy products may not be mixed together within a single food product, animals must
be slaughtered in a specific way, and the meat must be properly soaked and salted before
being cooked. Religious Jews are required to eat food that adhere to these standards and
that has been verified by religious authorities for compliance.
Violation of Jewish dietary restrictions may not lead to physical death, as may be the
case in dangerous medicines, but many adherents fervently believe that non-compliance
could permanently damage the soul. In order to aid religious Jews in their compliance,
Kashrut certification boards (KCBs) have arisen that certify food products for compliance
with religious standards. KCBs compete against one another and each board has its own
easily identifiable label. KCBs attract a following based on reputation and trust. Moreover,
religious Jews can easily identify KCBs that adhere most closely to their own personal
preferences for stringency. There is a natural distribution of personal preferences for
stringency to dietary restrictions within the population of religious Jews, and this distri-
bution is reflected in the distribution of types of KCBs that operate in the market.
The sustainability and success of KCBs for hundreds of years, spanning nations, is a
good illustration of how DCBs could thrive in the absence of an over-riding central
regulatory agency. Some individuals may want an extremely safe medicine that was given
approval by a known conservative DCB, just as religious Jews may want to eat food
products that are certified by the most stringent KCBs and that are consequently the most
expensive. Other individuals may be less risk averse, less willing to pay for, and in more
dire need of particular medicines. These latter individuals would have the option of using a
cheaper, ‘‘riskier’’ medicine approved by a less stringent DCB.11
If individuals were allowed to determine for themselves the optimal amount of safety
(or stringency) required, according to their own preferences and budget constraints, the
distribution of types of DCBs arising in a competitive drug approval market would likely
reflect this heterogeneity, and lead to increases in consumer welfare. Note that religious
Jews often consult with their spiritual leaders in order to choose the KCB that most closely
reflects their preferences for stringency. Local physicians could serve an analogous role
helping individuals to navigate between the different drug certifications on the market.
It is also reasonable to assume that a market in information on DCBs would quickly
arise, easing access to information and fostering transparency. KCBs have had to be very
careful in maintaining their reputations, and fraud has rarely been a problem. A KCB
11 Note that AIDS groups are now lobbying for a relaxation of drug approval requirements. See for example
the Gay Men’s Health Crisis (GMHC) at http://www.aegis.com/pubs/gmhc/1996/GM100503.html.
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that misleads its consumers goes out of business quickly.12 Today there are more than
100 KCBs as well as magazines that report changes in KCB standards and possible
corruption.
It is, therefore, easy to imagine that DCBs, in a vigorously competitive market, would
find it optimal to build a history of good drug approvals and to develop a trustworthy
relationship with their consumers. A DCB that bends to pressure from pharmaceutical
companies, and which is comprised of members who are ‘‘captured’’ by pharmaceutical
companies, would likely be quickly exposed. The marketability of the pharmaceutical
companies future products would consequently suffer.
The existence of competing DCBs in a well-functioning market with no central approval
agency should have a large depressing effect on the costs of R&D required for the
introduction of a new drug. Unnecessarily stringent rules and procedures for clinical tests,
dictated by overly cautious central agencies, would be eliminated along with bureaucratic
inefficiencies. In other words, a well-functioning market in drug approval will bring down
the costs of R&D and drug prices, just as privatization has led to cost decreases, lower
prices and accelerated innovation in other sectors of the economy.
Note also that a significant decrease in R&D costs through privatization could have a
large impact on the extensive margin. Currently, small biotech firms are finding it difficult
to raise sufficient funds to survive the lengthy and costly drug development process.
Fostering the entry of biotech firms into the pharmaceutical industry is important for more
innovation as well as more competition with traditional pharmaceutical firms. In the U.S,
30% of all drug approvals in 2002 went to biotech drugs.13 In 1999, they only represented
6%. According to the European Commission, half of the new medicine in development
today is based on biotechnology.
5.3 Potential pitfalls to privatization and unlimited data exclusivity
A competitive drug approval market that embedded unlimited data exclusivity would
obviously engender fierce opposition from generic firms. It might also face opposition from
consumer groups in favor of compromising data protection on non-economic grounds. One
argument rests on the consumers right to know test results. Ollila and Hemminki (1996)
make a case for more transparency in this regard. Admittedly, the existence of competing
DCBs would not totally resolve this problem but consumers would at least have the right to
choose which DCB to trust, and arguably have more indirect knowledge of the reliability
of a DCB’s tests than under the current centralized regulatory system. The profitability of
the DCB would serve as a strong signal of the reliability of their approvals.
Another non-economic argument against granting unlimited data exclusivity is that it
may lead to ‘‘needless’’ replication of testing on humans and animals (see Dukes 1996). In
order for a potential entrant to gain certification of a competing drug, clinical trials would
have to be repeated even though similar trials were already performed and shown to be
successful. This could expose patients to potential hazards. However, it could also be
argued that these ‘‘additional’’ tests are not at all unnecessary. They could help further
12 Many big food companies demand certification from KCBs with the highest standards in order to appeal
to the largest number of potential consumers.
13 This figure includes monoclonal antibody and recombinant protein products. (SMD, rDNA and mAb
therapeutics).
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establish, or even call into question, the safety of an already certified class of medicine.14
In any case, the much lower costs of conducting trials, resulting from the privatization, will
ease the burden of repetition.
Note that arguments for lengthening the period of data exclusivity have been advanced
before in the economics literature. For example, Grabowski (2004) holds that in order to
reduce uncertainty, lower litigation costs, and improve R&D incentives in the US, the US
data exclusivity period should be at least doubled to coincide more closely with the
European regime. This line of thought sees the optimal length of data exclusivity being
determined by a balance between the marginal cost of decreased innovation incentives
(which diminishes over time) and the marginal benefit of lower drug prices achieved
through generic competition.15 In our proposed system, lower drug prices come about
through privatization, a completely different mechanism. Thus, there is little extra benefit
in limiting data exclusivity as long as the cost of performing clinical trials is ‘‘reasonable’’.
6 Conclusion
Obtaining drugs at lower prices is a priority public policy issue. However, ensuring con-
tinued pharmaceutical innovation is also critical for increases in longevity, better health,
higher productivity and economic growth. Balancing the price of medicine against
incentives for continued drug innovation is a difficult challenge facing legislators.
This paper argues that a reduction in the price of pharmaceuticals could be brought
about by fostering competition in the drug approval process. Weak data protection laws
and generic competition is not necessarily the best solution to the drug-price problem.
Artificially low prices combined with exceedingly high and ever-increasing drug devel-
opment costs could lead to substantially lower levels of pharmaceutical R&D, innovation
and new life-saving medicines.
We maintain that a better solution to the drug-price problem lies in reforming the
monopolistic regulatory drug approval process. The abolishment of national drug admin-
istrations and their replacement with private competing drug certification boards, with the
power of final marketing authorization, could decrease the overall costs of drug devel-
opment without compromising public health, and without discouraging innovation.
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